Abstract
Introduction
History tells us that the Great Depression of the 1930s is considered to be a defining moment in terms of economic recessions. However, in the post-1930s, the nature of recession has become more complicated due to the development of sophisticated technological and related factors, particularly in the global financial architecture. Regulatory affairs for the financial sector have become extremely important in light of the proliferation of financial institutions and financial techniques that are getting further complicated with time. The development cycle of the whole "financial business" starts from a "bubble" and culminates in a "burst", when the pain becomes unbearable (for the society).This type of financial sector development (or rather financial sector activities) has made the world market incredibly volatile.
But, in spite of recognising the present disastrous role of the financial sector in the global economic/financial crisis, it is undeniable that a sound financial system is essential for the development of real economy. There is, of course, a need for banking and financial systems to coordinate between lending and borrowing requirements or to mobilise savings for investment needs. There is always a substantial need of capital for small and medium enterprises, which can be met by a well-developed banking and financial system. So long as the financial institutions are doing such activities, it is on the up and up; the problem, however, crops up when such institutions engage in excessive speculative activities to make more profits. The presupposed beneficial impact from the international financial sector (or architecture) at present is largely missing. According to Reddy: The belief that growth of the financial sector leads to economic development, and hence greater financialisation would necessarily add to efficiency and stability, stands discredited….The tendency of the financial sector to redistribute wealth in its own favour rather than create wealth, and its potential to distort commodity prices from genuine supply-demand factors indicate the need for an assessment of the optimal financial activity in the system ( Reddy 2011:135) .
Destabilising Mechanisms and Related Issues
Although ample literature is available on the motivating factors behind the 2008 financial crisis, for the purpose of the paper it is worth reviewing some of the most fundamental reasons and subsequently on the regulatory affairs pertaining to them. There are at least two basic reasons behind the recent financial crisis (a)Lack of understanding by borrowers regarding loans offered via complex financial products( triggered an ever-increasing risks associated with debt-related financing)
ii (b) Reckless loans provided by banks to borrowers without knowing their repaying ability( motivated by the originate-to-distribute model, bypassing risks to others, though actually risks lie with banks). The very fact of the concentration of substantial proportion of such loans into subprime mortgage ultimately revealed the whole gamut of such irrational financial practice. 
Essence of Regulation and Appropriate Regulatory Mechanisms for Global Finance
Bank of England Governor Mervyn King's comment: "While banks are global in life, they are national in death," relates to the fact that globalisation of finance has happened ahead of globalisation of regulation.
It is increasingly felt that the level of required sophistication in regulatory skills falls short of the complexity of the global financial system. Consequently, the question: What should be the ideal structure of the financial sector to achieve the desired beneficial impact? The challenge, therefore, lies in formulating appropriate policies to reactivate financial sector activities towards development for the real sector. Considering financial malfunctioning as a global evil, the development of appropriate policy regimes and scrutiny of the financial sector has become imperative. It is a fact that the costs of financial crises are more pronounced in poor and developing countries because of fragile regulatory and supervisory institutions. The social costs of financial crises are also much higher in these countries since they lack adequate social security nets and necessary fiscal space. Therefore, a concern appears regarding the appropriate policy regime to prevent financial/economic crisis. To quote :
At the same time, it is important to recognise that the financial sector should also be an instrument of public policy for facilitating development. Simply put, if public intervention is necessary and justified in the interest of correcting market imperfections to assure stability, there is no reason why public policy should not use regulation for development purposes. Further, if regulation is justified for containing possible asset bubbles in a free market system, there is no reason why that regulation should not be used for the creation of assets, especially more productive assets. (Volcker 2011) A better approach might be to draw lessons from some countries that are much less affected has seen amplification of risky assets as a consequence of excessive leverage. This has led to default on a large scale, affecting the whole financial system, and ultimately, the global economy as a whole. 
Exploring Some Regulatory Affairs
With the win of the Democrats in the US through Obama's reelection, the Dodd-Frank Act is, at least supposed to prevail. The Act has been criticised on several grounds, and despite missing a number of deadlines, it is a serious effort for a complete overhaul of the present US financial structure. Implementation of certain provisions remains a challenge also due to industry lobby, whereas often it is difficult to confirm whether certain concerns (on provisions of the Act) of different industry groups are driven by legitimate concerns for clarification on rules or simply " The proposal is an internationally uniform tax on all spot conversions of one currency into another, proportional to the size of the transaction. The tax would particularly deter short-term financial round-trip excursions into another currency." ( Tobin 1978:155) Elaborating on the functioning of such taxes, Tobin proposed the tax would be an internationally agreed uniform tax which would be administered by each government over its own jurisdiction.
He also did not eliminate the possibility of some stabilising long-term transactions getting discouraged, but he emphasized upon that the main purpose of such a tax is to curb extremely short period trading which are highly destabilising for the financial system. Such a tax on foreign exchange transactions is supposed to apply on all retail spot, swap and forward exchange of currencies. He stressed upon a globally uniform tax to avoid tax saving relocation efforts, whereas enforcement would depend on the major banks of the world and on the jurisdictions regulating such tax system ( Tobin 1996) . p.10).However, it can be remembered that the basic objective of Tobin tax is somewhat contradictory to the revenue generating capacity via such taxes, since if speculation is curbed, some amount of trading must disappear from the financial market reducing the tax base. On the other hand, if transaction taxes do not increase much consequent upon such taxes, the adverse impact on government revenue might be reduced. Though the importance of Tobin tax cannot be denied, the impact of such a tax in mitigating financial crises seems relatively less strong at the current juncture of the crisis that requires stricter regulation norms on lending practices of private sector banks.
Conclusion
To the extent economic recession happens due to normal ups and downs inherent in business cycles, it may be accepted, but global recession due to irrational financial practices (that never contribute to the real economy and only redistribute wealth within their domain) is inexcusable.
Worse still, is the process of bailing out such institutions from the taxpayer's money. Some mechanisms may be explored to create a buffer stock of reserves via collecting taxes from big multinational banks and financial institutions in boom times since bailing out such institutions during crises period through taxpayers' money is unfair and socially inequitable. Moreover, boom times should be seen with skepticism instead of being complacent, as too much of a good thing might turn to be as bad as the recent global crisis, which Minsky termed as 'stability breeds instability'. The regulatory affair should broaden its operational domain by going beyond the boundary of addressing certain failures, and incorporating its effort in influencing mindsets and ideas. Often, regulations face stiff opposition due to the strong political influence of vested interest groups, which prohibits enforcement and leads to a repetition of the crisis. Dealing with such deeper political aspects and implementation of regulatory mechanisms always remain a challenge. In an increasingly inter-connected global economy, some economies flourish while others find it hard to make ends meet. Instead of playing a blame game and politicising the issue, the better course would be to look for policies that address the fundamental problems of global imbalances in a cooperative manner and enforce these in letter and spirit.
